While Harvard University’s recent refusal to yield to the Trump administration should be applauded, its very ability to do so is born of ideological compromise.

The making of massive endowments is a more recent development than Harvard’s 389-year history might imply. While fundraising efforts began in earnest at Harvard in the mid-19th century, the university owes much of its present-day $53.2 billion stash — larger than the GDPs of almost 100 nations — to the Yale model of university financial planning, developed in the 1980s and ’90s, that has seen financial managers redirect endowment funds away from traditional stocks and bonds and into alternative asset classes through hedge funds, private equity, and venture capital. Despite swelling returns, universities concurrently adopted a practice of spending less than 5% of their endowments annually, an effort to keep outgoing cash lower than earnings. The goal of this conservative approach is endowment funds’ infinite growth, which should in theory allow wealthy universities to emerge from economic downturns largely unscathed.

But in practice the endowments are an albatross. University administrators are beholden to financial managers, and those managers are beholden to the bottom line, which in turn imposes its demands on university operations. As reported by Sammy Feldblum and John Schmidt for Jacobin, “Capital markets reward brand strength, endowment growth that outpaces operating expenses, a demonstrated ability to raise tuition, and the labor flexibility that comes from low rates of unionization and tenure on campus.” While Harvard may have no choice but to rely on its endowment to weather the Trump administration’s threats, it has historically been far more likely to choose growing its endowment over opportunities for moral and political leadership.