In a country that has already seen 15 military coups in its seven decades of independence, a new conflict is causing mass casualties and displacement. A mere four years after the ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir, the security forces he pitted against each other during his 30-year rule remain at odds: on the one hand, the armed forces loyal to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and, on the other, the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF), mostly composed of Janjaweed militias, loyal to the former warlord General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti).

After al-Bashir’s deposition, the military installed a transitional civilian government helmed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok — only to coup him on October 25, 2021, reinstall him the following month, then force his resignation on January 2, 2022. Since then, the military under al-Burhan has led the country, to the displeasure of both the Sudanese public and the army’s onetime ally the Janjaweed.

While they actually collaborated with civilian forces to topple al-Bashir in 2019, the Janjaweed is by no means a friend of the Sudanese people. From its founding decades ago to crush rebellion in Darfur to its violent quashing of peaceful protests in the wake of al-Bashir’s ouster, the Janjaweed has long functioned outside the purview of the military — a latitude that Sudanese protesters have sought to limit, including through the formal integration of RSF into the armed forces following the fall of al-Bashir.